

Designing for Human Mistakes

Shifting from changing behavior to changing design

Why?



The incomprehensible word

To *understand*:

“must originally have referred to the process of observation and learning rather than the result.”

<https://blog.oup.com/2022/02/the-incomprehensible-word-understand/>


Human *factors*

Performance

Behavior



Safe System Approach



Safe System Principles

SAFE SYSTEM PRINCIPLES



Death/Serious Injury is Unacceptable

While no crashes are desirable, the Safe System approach prioritizes crashes that result in death and serious injuries, since no one should experience either when using the transportation system.



Responsibility is Shared

All stakeholders (transportation system users and managers, vehicle manufacturers, etc.) must ensure that crashes don't lead to fatal or serious injuries.



Humans Make Mistakes

People will inevitably make mistakes that can lead to crashes, but the transportation system can be designed and operated to accommodate human mistakes and injury tolerances and avoid death and serious injuries.



Safety is Proactive

Proactive tools should be used to identify and mitigate latent risks in the transportation system, rather than waiting for crashes to occur and reacting afterwards.



Humans Are Vulnerable

People have limits for tolerating crash forces before death and serious injury occurs; therefore, it is critical to design and operate a transportation system that is human-centric and accommodates human vulnerabilities.



Redundancy is Crucial

Reducing risks requires that all parts of the transportation system are strengthened, so that if one part fails, the other parts still protect people.

Accept reality



Humans Make Mistakes

People will inevitably make mistakes that can lead to crashes, but the transportation system can be designed and operated to accommodate human mistakes and injury tolerances and avoid death and serious injuries.

Humans will error

a slip

a lapse

a mistake

or a *volitional act*.

To err is human, to forgive **design**.

(Alphonse Champanis)

The safe system approach

“It involves a paradigm shift to improve safety culture, increase collaboration across all safety stakeholders, and refocus transportation system design and operation on anticipating human mistakes and lessening impact forces to reduce crash severity and save lives.”

“The Safe System Approach requires a culture that places safety first and foremost in road system investment decisions.”

<https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/winter-2022/01>

<https://highways.dot.gov/safety/zero-deaths/safe-system-approach-presentation-0>

<https://highways.dot.gov/safety/zero-deaths>

Paradigm shift

Traditional

Prevent crashes —————→

Improve human behavior —————→

Control speeding —————→

Individuals are responsible —————→

React based on crash history —————→

Safe System

Prevent deaths and serious injuries

Design for human mistakes/limitations

Reduce system kinetic energy

Share responsibility

Proactively identify and address risks

Two possible paths


Judgment *versus* Observation



Needs and Feelings

Needs

Autonomy
Ease
Efficiency
Connection
To be seen
Belonging
Self-Expression
Security
Stimulation
Space
Adventure



Feelings

Engaged
Excited
Exhilarated
Grateful
Happy
Sanguine
Stimulated
Peaceful
Calm
Relaxed

We observe Strategies

Feeling(s) due to
unmet need(s)

Frustrated
Irritated/Agitated
Disconnected
Lonely
Tired
Fearful
Confused
Bored
Overwhelmed
Uncomfortable



Strategy (Action)

Speeding
Following too close
Distracted driving
Passing in no passing zone
Aggressive driving
Improper turn
Unsafe lane change
Mid-block crossing
Sidewalk cycling counterflow

Needs

Autonomy
Ease
Efficiency
Connection
To be seen
Belonging
Self-Expression
Security
Stimulation
Space
Adventure





The safe system approach

“Safe Roads is a continuum, not an absolute”

*“Applying a Safe System Approach has no one right answer. Instead, it starts with one critical question. **How can we design the roadway system around all users and make safety the default choice?** In short, a safe system is built around people, and it's built for saving lives.”*

<https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/winter-2022/01>

<https://highways.dot.gov/safety/zero-deaths/safe-system-approach-presentation-0>

<https://highways.dot.gov/safety/zero-deaths>

Dekker et al (2011)

When injury events “are seen as complex phenomena, there is no longer an obvious relationship between the behavior of parts in the system (or their malfunctioning, e.g. “human errors”) and system-level outcomes. Instead, **system-level behaviors emerge from the multitude of relationships and interconnections deeper inside the system, and cannot be reduced to those relationships or interconnections.**”

Dekker, S., Cilliers, P., & Hofmeyr, J. H. (2011). The complexity of failure: Implications of complexity theory for safety investigations. *Safety science*, 49(6), 939-945.

Shinar (2019)

“The prevalent notion that approximately 90 percent of the crashes are due to human errors or failures is due to a threshold bias, and the implied notion that 90 percent of the countermeasures should be directed at changing these behaviors is based on an erroneous assumption that the cure must be directly linked to the stated cause.”

“the impetus to greater safety is not necessarily to identify the underlying (human) cause (e.g., fatigue) but to focus on the descriptive situation that preceded the crash and then try to change the complete context.”

A tale of two approaches

◆ Behavior based approach

1. Identify Critical Behaviors
2. Observe Compliance using a Critical Behavior Inventory
3. Warn, Coach, Punish

◆ System based approach

1. Identify hazards
2. Estimate level of risk for each hazard
3. Control hazards according to a hierarchy

Assessing hazards

Hazard: A condition, entity, or event that presents a potential for injury or harm.

What conditions are reasonably foreseeable?

Where do conflicts exist?

How could a person experience injury?

Reasonably foreseeable

- ◆ an act or practice that must meet three necessary conditions
 - must be possible;
 - must be a use pattern that enables the prediction of an occurrence;
 - must occur with reasonable frequency.

Risk Matrix

FREQUENCY RATING	SEVERITY RATING			
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Extreme</i>
<i>Frequent</i>	C	D	E	F
<i>Occasional</i>	B	C	D	E
<i>Infrequent</i>	A	B	C	D
<i>Rare</i>	A	A	B	C

Crash Risk Ratings: *A: lowest risk level* *C: moderate-low risk level* *E: high risk level*
 B: low risk level *D: moderate-high risk level* *F: highest risk level*

Hierarchy of Controls

Most
effective



Least
effective




Image by NIOSH



Road Safety Assessments

When should an RSA be conducted?


Pre-construction:

- Scoping and Planning
- Preliminary through Detailed design



Construction:

- Work zones
- Pre-opening




Existing Roadways:

- Post-construction
- Proactive safety
- Reactive safety



Cost of improvements

Least



Most

A case study

- ◆ Recognize judgments and observations
- ◆ Distinguish behavior vs system based issues
- ◆ Categorize mitigation measures using safety hierarchy









Discussion of case study

Thank you for your time and attention

Michael Kuzel

mkuzel@4msafety.com

480-625-0782